

EXHIBIT NO. 95

(Handwritten note:)

MEMO

Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking officer mentioned is Adm. Richardson.

I think the paper is slightly Academic.

/s/ R. E. S.

I have read.

/s/ HRS.

I feel that in the evolving of the thought of which record is made in this memorandum, I have brought into clearer light than any in which I had seen it before a point which is, I feel, of fundamental importance in connection with any and all of our deliberations regarding courses to be taken in the field of major policy in regard to the Far East: a point which has to do with something that is definitely and inescapably fundamental. I am sure that you will not begrudge the time which it will take for you to read the memorandum.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Hand printed note:) Return to Op-13.

JULY 12, 1940.

In the course of a conversation yesterday with a high ranking officer of the Navy, there was put to me this question: *Is there an irresolvable conflict of interests and policies between the United States and Japan?*

I replied to this effect: There is today a fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan as regards major objectives and the policies which prevail, respectively, in consequence thereof and in regard thereto. This conflict can be resolved only by an abandonment on the part of one country or the other of those objectives and policies which it envisages and by which it proceeds at the present time. The United States has as its objectives: prevalence within and between and among nations of peace; prevalence of rules and provisions of law; prevalence of practices of justice; prevalence of practices of order; procedure by commitments and respect therefor; prevalence of equality of opportunity in terms of fair treatment; respect for rights of nations and of individuals; and due regard for interests of nations and [2] of individuals. Japan (the Japanese military leadership) has as its objectives today; spread and extension of Japanese political authority and economic control into and over areas outside of and beyond the boundaries of the present Japanese Empire (some of which areas are inhabited by independent nations and some of which are dependencies of other independent countries—but in none of which there is a Japanese population at present of more than a comparatively insignificant minority); a setting up by whatever means, positive or negative, may seem likely to contribute thereto, of a Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific; the working out of a "divine Destiny" which in the minds of not a few Japanese envisages first a vast Japanese empire in the Orient and ultimately a world supremacy for Japan's "Divine Emperor". These objectives are in fundamental conflict, globally and in detail.

In the case of the United States, the objectives stated are the objectives of the whole American people. In the case of Japan, the objectives stated are those of an essentially feudal leadership, the "military element", which comprises probably less than ten percent of the nation, which includes probably a majority of those Japanese who are descendants of the fighting men (the Daimyo and the Samurai) of the pre-restoration (1867) era, the spearhead among which is a considerable number of chauvinists among [3] the Army officer personnel and to a less extent among the Navy officer personnel, which leadership makes the nation's decisions and carries the nation with it.

The policies which are those of the United States are representative of the fundamental thoughts and beliefs and attitude of the people of the United States during the whole century and half of our national existence. Their roots run far back into the past. They run back to the days of Magna Charta, the days of John Hampden, the days of Oliver Cromwell, the days of the Pilgrims and the Cavaliers, the days of the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence, the days of Washington and Jefferson and John Paul Jones and James Monroe and Andrew Jackson; the days of the French Revolution; the days of emigration from Europe of the German liberals; the days of the Civil War; the days of our

liberation of Cuba; the days of our participation in the World War with popular enthusiasm for the ideas of fighting to end wars and to make the world safe for democracy: they are policies which in a general way express the thought and the aspirations, inherited by and developed under conditions of freedom in the minds of practically all of the 130 million persons who constitute the people of the United States. The policies which are those of Japan have no such universal and no such [4] deep-rooted acceptance in and among the 90 million persons who constitute the people of the Japanese Empire.

There is warrant for a belief that the conflict between American and Japanese objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is warrant for belief that one or the other of the countries might in course of time give up its present objectives and policies.

Where does the greater possibility, as regards relinquishment, lie? In giving consideration to that question, thought should be given to the comparative qualities of the two sets of objectives and policies. Which of the two is the more sound? Which of the two is more fundamental from points of view of human nature, of morality, et cetera? Then, consideration should be given to historical facts. It is a fact that the attitude, the objectives and the policies of the American people are a product of a long course of forward-looking evolution. It is a fact that the Japanese nation made in 1867 a substantial break with its own past, and that during the last eight decades the outlook upon life of the Japanese people and many of the practices of the Japanese State have undergone substantial change. To make a long matter short, is there not warrant for believing that a change in objectives and in policies by and on the part of Japan would be much easier and is much more readily conceivable than would be and is a change of the objectives and policies of the United States?

[5] How would (could) a change on Japan's part be brought about? If Japanese armed forces succeed in conquering China, taking Indochina, taking the Netherland East Indies, taking the Malay States, taking Thailand (Siam) and Burma, ultimately taking the Philippines, et cetera, et cetera, no change is likely. The conflict between Japanese interests and objectives and policies and those of the United States would continue and become intensified. But if Japan's efforts in China were to fail, if Japan's efforts to establish a great empire in the Far East were to be thwarted, if Japan's military leadership were to be in course of time discredited in the eyes of the middle classes and the common people of Japan, it is conceivable that the Japanese nation might work out a modification or even a reversal of Japan's objectives and policies.

It should be remembered that three centuries ago a great Japanese leader started out to conquer China and that ultimately the Japanese nation gave up that idea. It should be remembered that not long after the Japanese Army and Navy had withdrawn from Korea, another great Japanese leader decided to make Japan an isolated and secluded hermit nation: be forbade, to all intents and purposes, political, economic or cultural intercourse between Japan and the outside world.

[6] The present conflict between Japanese and American objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is little possibility, however, that the objectives and policies of the American people will be given up. Moreover, an abandonment of them would not resolve the conflict—for, an adoption, by the United States, in substitution for them, of objectives and policies similar to or identical with those of Japan would be impossible, and, if not impossible and if made, would merely create greater conflict. But an abandonment of Japan's present objectives and policies is a thing by no means impossible; is a thing which, if made, would admit of an adoption by Japan of policies similar to those of the United States, which adoption, if made and if lived up to, would resolve the whole conflict.

Surrender of the American objectives and policies in favor of Japan would serve no useful purpose. Maintenance of the American objectives and policies, patient but unremitting resistance by the United States and by other countries to Japan's efforts at conquest, has within it the possibility of an ultimate resolving of the conflicts between the objectives and policies of Japan and the objectives and policies of the United States (and those of several other countries).